Like any social phenomenon, the 'public understanding of science' is a matter of factual description, but also of societal discourse. The world we live and take for granted as 'natural' is raised and sustained through communication (see Luckmann, 1995) .
In addressing the evolution of public understanding of science (in short PUS) I must juggle two balls: in the one hand, the evolution of the discourse, in the other the empirical evidence of changes in public understanding. I will end with some speculations on the future of research into public understanding of science. I am in the situation of an epidemiologist who is asked: are people more depressed in 2000 than we were in 1900? He or she is painfully aware that the definition of depression has changed, and that any 'change in the rate of depression' might only reflect the change of definition. It is like scoring a game where the rules frequently change.
Evolution of discourse
The academic discussions of public understanding of science are increasingly reviewed. I will base my story largely on our recent account (see Bauer, Allum & Miller, 2007) , mainly based on the British experience over the past 25+ years: from Literacy, to PUS, to Science-in-Society. Each of these phases is moved by a polemic, attributing a particular deficit, and encouraging particular research questions and forms of interventions. Contrary to the rhetoric of polemicists, this is not a narrative of progress, but one of multiplication of discourses. What might look like a chronology in table 1 simply shows the relative age of discourses; the later does not entirely supersede the former.
Science literacy
The idea of scientific literacy sees science as an extension of the quest for reading, writing and numeracy. Furthermore, in a democracy people make political decisions; however, the public voice can only be effective if citizens command relevant knowledge. Thus, ignorance, scientific like political, only breeds alienation, demagogy and extremism.
The literacy idea attributes a knowledge deficit to the public. This deficit model of the public calls for increased efforts in science education. However, it also plays into the hands of technocratic attitudes among decision makers: an ignorant public is not qualified to take part in decisions.
An influential concept of science literacy includes four elements: (a) knowledge of basic textbook facts of science, (b) an understanding of methods such as probability reasoning and experimental design, (c) an appreciation of the positive outcomes of science and technology for science, and (d) the rejection of superstitious beliefs such as astrology or numerology. This became the basis of the bi-annual science indicator surveys of the US National Science Foundation (NSF) from the late 1970s onwards. The measurement of factual knowledge is the key problem of this paradigm. Knowledge is measured by quiz-like items. Respondents are asked to decide whether a statement of a scientific fact is true, false or whether they don't know. Some of these items have travelled far across the globe, and hit the news headlines.
Critics have argued that the essence of science is method and not facts. Therefore awareness of issues like uncertainty, peer reviewing, the settling of scientific controversies, and replication of experiments should be reflected in the assessment of literacy.
Since the 1970s many countries have undertaken audits of adult scientific literacy: USA, Canada, China, Brazil, India, Korea, Japan, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Britain, Germany and France and EU generally through EUROBAROMETER. The analysis of these data remains problematic. A possible problem of any comparison remains the fairness of the indicator. Countries have different science bases, and literacy reflects these science bases. The issue of unbiased literacy measures deserves more attention (see Raza, Singh & Dutt, 2002) . 
Public Understanding of Science
In the second half of the 1980s, new concerns emerge under the title 'public understanding of science'. This transition is marked by the influential report of the Royal Society of London of 1985. Like the previous literacy phase, the diagnosis is that of a public deficit. However, now attitudes to science are fore-grounded. The public does not show sufficient support for science; and this is of concern to scientific institutions. The Royal Society took the view of many of its members and assumed that better knowledge will be the driver of positive attitudes; hence the axiom: 'the more you know, the more you love it'.
This research agenda moved away from knowledge to that of attitudes. The concern for scientific literacy carried over to test the expectation 'the more you know, the more you love it'. However, the emphasis shifted from a threshold measure to that of a continuum: one is not literate or illiterate, but more or less knowledgeable. And the correlation between knowledge and attitude becomes the main focus of research. But the expectation that better knowledge drives positive attitudes is not confirmed. Although overall there may be some relation, on controversial issues there is no correlation at all. Well and less well informed citizens are to be found on either side of the controversy. Social psychology, though not the Royal Society, knows for some time that knowledge it not a driver of attitude, but a quality index: attitudes, whether positive or negative, that are based on knowledge are held more strongly and thus resist change. Well-informed and less well-informed citizens make up their minds differently, but do not necessarily come to different conclusions.
PUS research extended its concepts, methods and data. Attitudes to science may be part of general political sophistication, a public resource not specific to science. The polemic over public deficits also stimulated complementary data streams, such as qualitative discourse analyses and mass media monitoring, which reveal long-term trends such as the medicalisation of science news over the last 30 years (see Bauer, 1998) .
PUS had a rationalist and a realist agenda. For the rationalist, attitudes arise from information processing with a rational core. It is assumed that if people had all the information, and were able to understand probabilities, they would be more supportive of science. The battle for the public is a battle for minds with more information and the correct statistical reasoning (i.e. risk perception).
For the realist, attitudes are emotional relations with the world. How emotions may relate to rationality is a vexing question. Realists understand emotions with the logic of advertising. Thus, the battle for the public mind becomes a battle for hearts. How to attract public attention? The issue becomes one of 'sexing up' evidence. The public is the consumer who is be seduced. In this log, there is little difference between scientific news and washing powder.
The critique of PUS again focused on the deficit models of knowledge or attitude: Negative attitudes are neither an expression of lack of knowledge nor of good judgment. However, the attribution of a public deficit expresses the timidity or even 'institutional neuroticism' (Brian Wynne), the diffuse anxieties and condescendence of scientific actors vis-à-vis the public. The public deficit model is in fact a self-fulfilling prophecy: the public, a-priori deficient, cannot be trusted. Mistrust on the part of scientific actors will be paid back in kind with public mistrust. Negative public attitudes then confirm the assumption among scientists: the public is not to be trusted. This circularity called for 'soul searching' among scientific actors.
Science in-and-of Society
Science-in-Society reversed the deficit idea: not with the public, but with the scientific institutions and their actors who have lost the trust of the public. Evidence of negative attitudes to science during the BSE crisis (early 1990s), the debate over GM food (late 1990s), and diverse social research led to the diagnosis of a 'crisis of confidence' in the famous House of Lords report of 2000. Science and technology stand in a relationship with society. A crisis of trust indicates a breach of contract that needs patching up. False conceptions of the public operate among scientists and in policy making, i.e deficit concepts of the public; and these misguide communication efforts and interventions and alienate the public still further.
Many Science-in-Society activists are committed action researchers who do not separate analysis from intervention. The aim is to change science policy. This agenda, academically grounded as it may be, often ends up as political consultancy. Advice is offered on how to rebuild public trust. Public deliberation and participation is the Lord's road to rebuild trust. Event making is advocated: hearings, citizen juries, deliberative opinion polling, consensus conferencing, tables rondes, scoping exercises, science festivals, and national debates and so forth. As these events are costly and require know-how to organise, they become the remit of private 'angels' rather than civil servants or academics. 'Angels' are age-old go-betweens, but here not between heaven and earth but between a disenchanted public and the institutions of science, industry and policy making. Thus, an industry emerges that exudes confidence by apparently knowing how to overcome this crisis of public trust.
The ethos of public participation was soon complemented by an ethos of evaluation. In the utilitarian spirit of modern politics sooner or later the question arises: and what do these science events bring (effectiveness)? What is their value for money (efficiency)? Are there any unintended consequences that are better avoided?
Ironically, to evaluate participatory policy makers re-turn to traditional ideas of public literacy of science research, running the risk of the re-inventing the wheel of literacy, attitudes, interests, and media attention, albeit this time for a different car, namely the evaluation of public deliberation. The re-entry of PUS via the backdoor of evaluation research is ironic but unavoidable. I spend much of my public speaking reminding people of what we already know in order to avoid the inefficiencies of re-invention the wheel.
Evidence of change in public understanding
In this context, assessing the evidence of changes in PUS becomes highly relevant. I will present two kinds of data streams. Firstly, there is the evidence for changes in the public attention to science taken in mass media monitoring over a longer period of time. Secondly, I will report on large scale comparisons for scientific literacy, attitudes and interest, across very different contexts and over time, from 1989 to 2005 in Europe.
The Figure 1 shows the coverage of science and technology in the British press between 1946 and 1992 (see Bauer et al, 2006) . This is a study we completed in mid 1990s and since seek to update. Among other things we asked ourselves how much science coverage there was, and how does news relate to science, positively or negatively. The figure shows that the presence of science in the public is not a constant, nor is its evaluation.
There are two kinds of intensity figures: one is the estimate of absolute numbers of articles, the other relative to the news space which expanded enormously since the 1940s when there was paper rationing. Public attention peaked in the early 1960s, declined into the 1970s, and seems to recover since. The moving average is like a heat indicator of science. The relative figures clearly mark the peak in the early 1960s, which as it seems has not been recovered since. Evaluation equally fluctuates; however, not entirely parallel to news intensity. Only in the 1950s does much news also mean good news. Here we are in the post-war era and its enthusiasm for 'atoms for peace' and the roll out of civil nuclear power that carries public opinion. In the 2 nd half of the 1960s, the British press turns more sceptical and remains so, only to recover a trend towards more positive tone into the 1990s. It might well be that this shows the influence of the Royal Society's 1985 appeal to more coverage and more positive coverage on the part of the mass media. The Figure 2 shows what happened since the 1970s: biotechnology news (answering to keywords like genetics, genes, cloning, biotechnology etc.) in a single British newspaper (see bar chart). Coverage reaches its peak in 1999 with the 'Great Food Debate' over genetically modified crops and derived food stuffs. Our score shows more than 1600 references in a daily paper in one year. This was a news event, though not at the level of war (Iraq) or terrorism (Northern Ireland; 9-11 in New York; or 7-05 in London).
The line graphic shows the tone of the news, deviating from the overall positive average. It shows highly positive news in the early 1980s, then with rising news intensity the declining enthusiasm of commentary. After 1996, with the arrival of gm crops and Dolly the sheep, the news becomes rather erratic, but stays overall with a more sceptical tone. These two graphics suggest is the following:
• The flow of science news in British society, and probably elsewhere is not a constant
• The evaluation tone of science news is equally not a constant.
• Negative news is not an expression of anti-scientific complex: overall science news and genetic news do not run in parallel. They do from 1946 to the 1970s; since they part ways. General science news becomes more positive again; biotechnology news is treated more sceptical.
• Contrary to assumptions of a natural cycle of public attention, science news does not move from initially negative news and public outcry to more considerate and positive news with time (e.g. Haldane, 1925) . To the contrary: initial hype, as with new genetics, gives later way to more considered coverage.
Industrial and Post-industrial PUS
Let us now turn to the evidence of changing public understanding of science that emerges from comparative survey research. Some years ago (see Bauer et al, 1994) wanted to put to rest the debates over the knowledge-attitude model of the Royal Society: the more you know, the more you love it. This was not so much a false observation, but one that was not universally valid. We called our model the post-industrial model of PUS: as a society moves long the axial transition from an industrial to a post-industrial and knowledge intensive economy, the distribution and relation between people's knowledge, their interests and attitudes to science fall differently. The results confirm what was initially observed across Europe in a global context. Moving along the scale of economic development, as indicated by GDP per capita, people are generally more knowledgeable of science, not least because education is the key driver of scientific literacy and economic development. If we compare literacy levels with aggregate attitudes to science (see Figure 3 : two attitude items combined: 'S&T make our lives more comfortable, easier, and healthier'; 'Scientists should be allows to experiment on animals'), we find the non-linear relationship which we predicted. India lies generally on the left side of the development scale, Europe on the right hand side. As Indian States move up the knowledge scale, so do positive attitudes; while in Europe more knowledge comes together with more sceptical attitudes. Overall we can model this with an inverted U-shape relationship between knowledge and attitudes. It seems that somewhere on this axial transition the inversion occurs: below a certain level knowledge drives positive attitudes, beyond that point, knowledge drives sceptical attitudes towards science. This is only cross-sectional evidence, comparing European and nonEuropean contexts. A conclusive test of the post-industrial PUS hypothesis, a dynamic model, requires longitudinal evidence in any one of these contexts. science is omnipotent, part of the solution not the problem, will one day provide a complete world picture, and should have full autonomy. Statistically, these items form a consistent scale, positioning people with regard to and ideology and myth of science.
By plotting the average scores of 'scientific ideology' we find a negative correlation with level of socio-economic development across Europe. As economic development and science literacy increases, belief in scientific ideology decreases (correlation is r = -0.74). The negative correlation between knowledge and the myth of science also holds at the individual level (no shown here). In European countries low on the GDP scale, the correlation between knowledge and myth of science is positive -the more literate the more you subscribe to the ideology of science. As you move to the higher end the GDP scale, this correlation becomes ever more negative: the more you know, the less likely you subscribe to a view that science is omnipotent, always part of the solution, will offer a complete world picture, and should have no constraints. Our analysis of the same data also shows (not shown here), that the rejection of an ideology of science goes together with a utilitarian view of science: it depends on the consequences, case by case?
• These comparisons show that for once and with regard to public understanding of science, the Royal Society's 1985 view is not universally true, but particular. The operational axiom 'the more you know, the more you love it' might be correct in the context of a developing and industrial society. But in the knowledge intensive postindustrial context this is no longer the case, rather: 'familiarity might breed (some) contempt'[or at least a sceptical loyalty].
• Furthermore, the educated publics of Europe are more and more sophisticated as to their image of science. Citizens are less impressed by views of science which amount to a modern 'myth of science'. The more knowledgeable people are, the less they are inclined to ideological views of science; they assume a more utilitarian assessment.
Changes across Europe: 1989 to 2005
What is the evidence of longitudinal change? I have recently embarked to construct a European database of all comparable surveys of public understanding since the 1970s.
ii This database will allow us to look at four waves of questions asked in 12 European countries four times since 1989. Each survey collected 1000 interviews across EU-12 and we have about 60 comparable questions.
We can now construct age cohorts across these different surveys (technically speaking these are quasi-cohorts because constructed ex-post). This means we regroup for each survey the respondents born in a particular period of European history. A cohort is defined as entering a system at the same time. This gives us a virtual view of historical developments across different generations and their experiences.
We defined five cohort groups: Roaring 1920s, War&Crisis, Baby Boomers, Gen X and New Order (see appendix). For each of our variables -knowledge, interest and attitude -we can now trace the virtual trajectory through five generations and compare these in 12 EU countries. Let us look at knowledge in figure 5. The overall picture is one of increasing knowledge with generations. The large step was from Roaring 20s to Baby Boomers, since little has moved. One can compare the different countries for each generation; but we would probably be most interested in the more recent generations, as they carry the 'torch of the future'. The ordering between the countries seems to be rather different in Generation-X and New Order. For example in Italy, there is a significant decline in scientific knowledge from the generation of the 1960s to that of the 1980s. In the UK, it seems that the Baby Boomers are the leaders in scientific literacy, not to be rivalled by later generations. Let us look at interest in science in figure 6 . Overall, EU unification manifests itself in converging levels of scientific interest among the later born generations: we see an overall regression towards the mean, and declining variance. France shows an inter-generational decline of interest in science, Germany and Portugal show continuous increase, most accentuated in the latter. In Italy and the UK, there were ups and downs. The Italian New Order generation is clearly less interested in science than its predecessor, the Gen X of the 1960s.
Finally, let us look at attitudes to science in Figure 7 , in particular the expectation that 'science makes our lives more comfortable, easier, and healthier'. The picture is again one of different trajectories, but, by contrast to interest, none of European conversion. Overall, the Baby Boomers and Generation-X are the most positively inclined in their view of science. While Germany shows very little inter-generational difference, and rather positive attitudes; the These data show us diverse trajectories of PUS across the Europe EU-12 with the following conclusions:
• Data integration carries enormous potential to create indicators of cultural, intergenerational dynamics.
• This dynamics is likely to be different in different contexts which would suggest that we are tapping into a 'scientific culture' with a specific dynamic that needs to be explained.
• Knowledge is overall increasing across the generations in all contexts; while the literacy of different generations rank order differently across different countries.
• Interest is converging across generations. Some countries shows secular decline, while other secular increase in scientific interest.
• Attitude to science shows very diverse inter-generational dynamics in the different countries.
3. Mapping to societal conversation of science: distances and topography
The paper ends with some speculation on where this all might lead to and come together. The public understanding of science always had a double nature. It is on the one hand a field of activity of outreach from science to the public. This includes traditional activities like lecturing, writing popular books and organising science museums, to making radio and television programmes, to more recent science centres, cafe scientifique, and consensus conferences and deliberative forums on controversial matters. It seems that this field of activity has expanded considerably over the last 10 or more years, internationally. On the other hand, public understanding of science is a small field of social scientific research full of common sense speculations. After all, it is rather difficult to step out of common sense and to be scientific about common sense.
Faced with the task of describing the evolution of public understanding of science, one faces an evolution with two strands: Firstly, the evolution of discourse from Science Literacy to Science & Society with its polemic over the notion of 'public deficits'; secondly, the evidence on substantive changes in the public's relation to science.
The presence of science in public conversations, as indicated by media presence, is not a constant. It comes in waves, one in the 1950s and 1960s, and again since the 1990s to the present.
The survey evidence shows that the public understanding of science might be significantly different in an industrial-developing context and a knowledge-intensive developed context. In the latter more knowledge does not bring more support for science, rather utilitarian scrutiny, and an end to widespread beliefs in ideology and myths of what science might be.
Contrary to the tenants of the 'public deficit' idea, I do not consider a sceptical public as a problem, rather as a resource that needs to be maintained and invested in. This is particularly important as ever more science conducted in the private sector, within a commercial logic. In this context, a critical public is an asset rather than a problem for the future of science (see Bauer, 2008; Bauer & Gregory, 2007) .
But to establish what proportion of the public is critical of science, and to spread worry about this, has not been my purpose today. My main point is to demonstrate the viability of indicators of public understanding of science, both in the context of large scale international comparisons, but also longitudinally over time. Such indicators are important to map out the changing relations between science and society, which is both a historical and a global variable. This is very much the future of survey research in PUS. Surveys are ultimately, despite their reputation as the 'Gold Standard' of social research, just snapshots in time. If we are seriously interested dynamics and processes, we need to consider repeated measures and advocate the survival of such measures in a time of short memory and shifting agendas, but we also need to consider complementary data streams such as media monitoring and discourse mappings (Bauer, Shukla & Allum, 2007) .
It might be informative to go back to a classical text in the sociology of knowledge by Fleck (1935) on the 'making of a scientific fact'. Fleck suggested an image of concentric spheres of science, similar to a planetary system of a centre and circulating peripheries (see figure 8 ). With this core-periphery model of science, Fleck intimates that an esoteric centre of scientific activity is surrounded by concentric exoteric genres of public communication such as handbooks and textbooks, popular science productions, mass media coverage of science and everyday conversations. As we move from the esoteric to the exoteric spheres, things get simplified, more concrete, and more certain in judgement, exactly what one expects popular science to do: tell us how things are or how they are not, the known knowns and the known unknowns! Flecks claims that scientists depend on these exoteric circles not only for social legitimacy but also for epistemic reassurance. Public communication is the elixir of life of science. Thus the public opinion of science is not an epiphenomenon of scientific activity that can be considered or dismissed at a whim. To contrary it is a crucial feature of its operations and a condition of continuity. It is also important to recognise that this Eso-Exo relationship cannot be accounted for as mutual deficits. First and foremost, relationships are characterised by relative distance and quality of conversations. And this topography must be our research focus. Thus the problem of PUS research for the future will be to map the esoteric-exoteric distance of the public conversation from science. To make this an informative exercise this must be an international exercise based on comparable data streams, like Eurobarometer has achieved to some extent across Europe. At a conference in November 2007 at the Royal Society in London, an international team of researchers began to inventory the existing databases and to assess their comparability. We have even attempted to construct a 'Cultural Indicator of Science' giving each country an index value similar to the Human Development Index (see . The idea of measuring a cultural distance between science and the public is not an entirely new idea, but emerges from discussions with Indian collagues (see Raza, Singh & Dutt, 2002) . In time such measures of distance will make useful tools to evaluate the current 
Students
of relationships, but do they really achieve what they set out to achieve? This is an eminently Like other relationships, science-society is not just a matter of distance, but also one of quality.
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